Horizon Scan: Three Scenarios for the Eastern Mediterranean Through 2030

Why It Matters

The Eastern Mediterranean's maritime future to 2030 will most likely be decided by one question: do coastal states keep managing an unresolved delimitation deadlock, or do they move to a regional conference format and then to energy-cooperation arrangements that include Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots? This Horizon Scan sets out three scenarios, the legal facts beneath them, and the signposts that would show which way the basin is moving.

The stakes are practical: offshore gas licensing, subsea cables and pipelines, naval deployments, and the security of sea lanes linking Europe, North Africa and the Levant. The scenarios below are analytical judgements, not forecasts, and each is labelled with the assumptions it requires.

Background

The basin has no comprehensive maritime boundary map. Most delimitation is bilateral and partial, and the parties disagree on the legal rules that should govern it. Türkiye has the longest continental coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles). Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration are parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Türkiye is not, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry describes Türkiye as a persistent objector to certain provisions of it.

The core legal disagreement

• Greece argues that islands, including Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, generate a full continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under UNCLOS Article 121, and that the only dispute is delimitation, which it would refer to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
• Türkiye argues that delimitation must reach an equitable result under customary international law. It cites cases where courts gave small islands reduced or no effect against a longer mainland coast, such as the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration on the Scilly Isles and the 2009 ICJ judgment in the Black Sea case (Romania v. Ukraine). Ankara holds that Aegean questions are interlinked and need bilateral negotiation.

For a deeper legal explainer, see Fact Check: Do Greek Islands Cancel Türkiye's Continental Shelf and Maritime Projection? and the sister-publication guide Monitor of Nations: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Jurisdiction, Equity and the Law of the Sea.

Chronology of the key instruments

Date	Event	Why it matters
2003	Greek Cypriot administration–Egypt EEZ agreement	Türkiye says it overlaps its continental shelf, notably Greek Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7
2004	Türkiye begins registering continental shelf coordinates with the UN; 24 April Annan Plan referendum (64.91% of Turkish Cypriots in favour, 75.83% of Greek Cypriots against); 1 May Greek Cypriot administration joins the EU	Parallel legal and political turning points
2007 and 2010	Greek Cypriot administration–Lebanon and –Israel EEZ agreements	Türkiye and the TRNC say these disregard Turkish Cypriot rights
2009 and 2012	TPAO (Türkiye's state petroleum company) exploration licences	Start of Türkiye's licensing activity
19 and 21 September 2011	Greek Cypriot drilling starts; Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement signed	Joint Turkish and Turkish Cypriot legal position
27 November 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction MoU	Delimits between the two coasts; contested by Greece, Egypt and the EU
18 March 2020	Türkiye registers its continental shelf outer limits with the UN	Formal notification of Ankara's position
2020	Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement (August); President Erdoğan proposes an Eastern Mediterranean conference	Rival frameworks and a dialogue offer
7 December 2023	Athens Declaration on friendly relations between Türkiye and Greece	Calmer bilateral climate, no delimitation settlement
16 April and 12 June 2025	Türkiye announces its Marine Spatial Planning, then records it with IOC-UNESCO	Position placed on record with a UN body for the first time
24 July 2025	Presidential Circular creates an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry	Institutional follow-up

On the Libya instrument, see The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime MoU: What It Says, What Egypt and Greece Argue, and Why It Matters. On the Turkish Cypriot side, see Turkish Cypriot Hydrocarbon Proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019: What Was Offered and Why It Matters.

Key Players & Positions

Actor	Stated position	Primary source type
Greece	Islands generate full maritime zones; the Türkiye–Libya MoU ignores Greek islands such as Crete and Kastellorizo; the 2020 Egypt agreement is a lawful partial delimitation; disputes belong before the ICJ	Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements, notes to the UN
Greek Cypriot administration (presents itself as the Republic of Cyprus)	Claims sovereign rights over an EEZ proclaimed by law in 2004 and licences blocks; says revenues will serve all Cypriots, with Turkish Cypriot shares handled through a fund after a settlement	Cypriot government statements, EEZ legislation
Egypt	Treats the 2003 Cyprus agreement and the 2020 Greece agreement as valid; regards the Türkiye–Libya MoU as lacking legal effect; has meanwhile normalised ties with Türkiye since 2023–2024	Egyptian Foreign Ministry statements, notes to the UN
European Union	Backs Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration on member-state sovereignty and sovereign rights; adopted a sanctions framework in November 2019 on unauthorised drilling; calls for dialogue	European Council conclusions
TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and Turkish Cypriots	Hold equal and inherent rights over the island's offshore resources; signed the 2011 agreement with Türkiye; proposed joint committee and revenue-sharing arrangements in 2011, 2012 and 2019	TRNC government statements and proposals
Libya	The Tripoli-based authorities that signed the 2019 MoU defend it; eastern Libyan institutions have contested it, so its status in domestic politics is a variable	Libyan government statements

Both Greece and the EU are on record that they prefer legal or diplomatic settlement, and Ankara says the same, so the shared vocabulary of dialogue is real. The dispute is over scope and venue: Greece wants a narrow ICJ referral, while Ankara wants broader negotiation that covers the Aegean and the Turkish Cypriot dimension.

Horizon Scan: Three Scenarios to 2030

The scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Scenario A is the default; B and C require political decisions that are not yet taken.

Scenario A: Managed Deadlock (0–2 years)

Premise. Neither side concedes on islands, the Libya MoU or the Seville Map, but both keep tensions low through a 'calm waters' approach after the December 2023 Athens Declaration.

What it looks like.

• Low-level friction over surveys, naval exercises and cable or pipeline routes, such as the 2024 survey activity for the Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnector near Kasos, where a Turkish naval presence was reported.
• Competing maritime spatial plans and marine protected areas, including Türkiye's April 2025 plan and the Finike Marine Protected Area, answered by Greek marine park and planning measures.
• Continued ICJ-versus-negotiation argument, with no agreed agenda.

Main risk. A seismic vessel or drill ship incident, as in August 2020, could break the calm.

Signposts. Frequency of NAVTEX (navigational warning) overlaps; whether Greece and Türkiye keep holding high-level and exploratory meetings; Libyan domestic moves on the 2019 MoU.

Scenario B: A Regional Conference Format (mid-term, roughly 2–4 years)

Premise. Coastal states accept a structured forum. In 2020 President Erdoğan proposed an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots.

What it would take.

• Agreement that participation includes the TRNC or Turkish Cypriot representation, since Ankara treats this as a precondition.
• Egypt as a bridge, given its normalisation with Türkiye and its existing agreements with the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece.
• An initial agenda limited to non-sovereignty items: marine safety, search and rescue, environmental protection, data sharing and de-confliction.

Constraints. The Greek Cypriot administration and Greece worry that a conference could dilute UNCLOS-based claims or confer recognition. Ankara worries that forums dominated by the EU or the East Mediterranean Gas Forum exclude it.

Signposts. A shared chair or a rotating secretariat; official statements from Cairo supporting wider inclusion; EU language shifting from 'solidarity' to 'inclusive regional cooperation'. The Cyprus track also matters. See Cyprus Horizon: What Comes After the 2024 New York Meeting and the Federation Impasse?.

Scenario C: Energy-Cooperation Arrangements (long-term, toward 2030 and beyond)

Premise. Delimitation questions stay legally open, but cooperation arrangements are agreed on a without-prejudice basis.

What it could include.

• A joint committee and revenue-sharing mechanism of the type the TRNC proposed in 2011, 2012 and 2019.
• Gas export routes, with Türkiye's existing pipeline and terminal infrastructure as an option alongside Egyptian liquefaction capacity. The US withdrew support for the EastMed pipeline in January 2022, citing economic and political feasibility, which reopened the question.
• Joint data pools on seabed surveys and environmental monitoring.

What would have to be true. Either a Cyprus settlement or a without-prejudice formula that recognises Turkish Cypriot rights. Ankara's own draft leans toward the latter, while the Greek Cypriot administration prefers to channel any Turkish Cypriot share through a fund after a settlement.

Signposts. A shift in private-sector behaviour, with major operators accepting licences or consortia that explicitly include Turkish and Turkish Cypriot partners; an agreed hydrocarbon committee; a new United Nations process on Cyprus.

Scenario comparison

Scenario	Horizon	Relative likelihood (editorial judgement)	Key dependency
A: Managed deadlock	0–2 years	Highest	Continued restraint at sea
B: Regional conference	2–4 years	Moderate, conditional	Inclusion of TRNC; Egyptian mediation
C: Energy cooperation	To 2030 and beyond	Lowest, but highest payoff	Cyprus settlement or without-prejudice formula

A fourth path, escalation, is possible after a naval incident, but it is a deviation from A rather than a stable end-state, since all capitals have stated that they prefer calm.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine (Türkiye's Position): Eastern Mediterranean

• Equity, not island cut-off. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, maritime delimitation must produce an equitable result in light of coastal geography and proportionality, so that islands close to a mainland cannot cut off the projection of Türkiye's 870 km coast. Ankara cites customary international law and decisions such as the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, and says Türkiye is not bound by UNCLOS provisions to which it has persistently objected.
• Equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara and the TRNC hold that Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island with equal and inherent rights over offshore resources. The legal basis includes the 1960 settlement and the Treaty of Guarantee, the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, and the TRNC's hydrocarbon proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019.
• Registered, documented jurisdiction. Türkiye points to its UN continental shelf notifications from 2004, the registration of its outer limits on 18 March 2020, the 27 November 2019 Libya MoU, and the 16 April 2025 Marine Spatial Planning recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• No role for the EU as adjudicator. The Turkish Foreign Ministry rejects the Seville Map, which Ankara says confines Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It also argues that the EU has no competence to decide maritime boundaries, which are a matter for the states concerned or for judicial settlement agreed by them. See The Global Anatomy: The Seville Map Explained and The Worldlogue: Can the European Union Decide Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Boundaries?.
• Dialogue with inclusion. President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference with all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots remains Ankara's stated preferred framework. Türkiye backs that approach with national capacity: the drilling vessels Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han and the survey vessel Oruç Reis, discussed in Defense Autonomy and Strategic Maneuver Space.

Ankara's argument is that its position rests on coastline length, equity and treaty practice, and that any arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC cannot be durable. The doctrine's weak points, as critics note, are Türkiye's non-party status to UNCLOS and the fact that the IOC-UNESCO record is a registry rather than a judicial endorsement.

Source Comparison

Issue	Greek, EU and international framing	Turkish primary-source framing	Editorial note
Islands and maritime zones	Islands generate full zones under UNCLOS Article 121; Türkiye's claims are maximalist	Equity and proportionality; mainland coast is decisive; Türkiye is a persistent objector to UNCLOS provisions	Courts have given varying effect to islands, so case-by-case geography matters
Türkiye–Libya MoU (2019)	Disregards Greek islands; infringes third-state rights (European Council language)	Valid bilateral delimitation between two opposite coasts, in line with equity	Status depends partly on Libyan domestic politics
Cyprus hydrocarbons	Greek Cypriot administration is the internationally recognised government; Turkish Cypriots share after a settlement	Turkish Cypriots hold equal present rights; joint committee and revenue sharing proposed	The central dispute is who speaks for the island
Role of the EU	Solidarity with member states; sanctions framework (2019)	EU has no competence to delimit and is a party in practice	The EU is both a political actor and a non-judicial body
IOC-UNESCO registration (2025)	A national planning record, which does not determine boundaries	First recording of Türkiye's position with a UN body	Both are accurate: registered, but not adjudicated
Conference format	Prefers existing frameworks such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum and ICJ referral	Inclusive regional conference with the TRNC	Inclusion is the sticking point

For additional doctrinal context from sister publications, see The Political Anatomy: Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction: The Complete Guide and Doctrine Review: Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction. Our sourcing approach is set out in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; rights over it exist ipso facto and are delimited by agreement or adjudication.
• EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) in which a coastal state has sovereign rights over resources; it is an UNCLOS concept that Türkiye treats differently from the continental shelf.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, built on equity and its coastline.
• TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Türkiye; the Greek Cypriot administration represents the Republic of Cyprus in the UN and EU.
• Seville Map: a map associated with a University of Seville study that, in Ankara's view, confines Türkiye to a narrow zone in the Gulf of Antalya.
• Marine Spatial Planning (MSP): a framework for allocating sea uses, recorded by Türkiye with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025.

Related guides: The Political Horizon home, About The Political Horizon, Frequently Asked Questions: Sources, Method and Perspective, Security Horizon: Terror-Free Türkiye, and Crossroads Review: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Perspective Note

The Political Horizon presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside analysis of the wider strategic picture, and says so openly to its readers. Claims on Türkiye's doctrines are attributed to primary sources such as official statements, treaty texts, UN documents and Ottoman and other state archives. — The Political Horizon Editorial Team